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Abstract. In this paper we show how the defense relation among abstract ar-
guments can be used to encode the reasons for accepting arguments. After in-
troducing a novel notion of defenses and defense graphs, we propose a defense
semantics together with a new notion of defense equivalence of argument graphs,
and compare defense equivalence with standard equivalence and strong equiv-
alence, respectively. Then, based on defense semantics, we define two kinds of
reasons for accepting arguments, i.e., direct reasons and root reasons, and a no-
tion of root equivalence of argument graphs. Finally, we show how the notion of
root equivalence can be used in argumentation summarization.
Keywords: abstract argumentation, defense graph, defense semantics, argumen-
tation equivalence, argumentation summarization
1 Introduction
Abstract argumentation is mainly about evaluating the status of arguments in an argu-
ment graph [1,2,3], which is composed of a set of abstract arguments and a set of attacks
between them [4]. In many topics such as equivalence [5,6,7], summarization [8], and
dynamics in argumentation [9,10], the notion of extensions plays a central role. Since
in classical argumentation semantics, an extension is a set of arguments that are collec-
tively accepted, the existing theories and approaches based on this notion are mainly
focused on exploiting the status of individual arguments. However, besides the status
of individual arguments, in many situations, we need to know the reasons for accepting
arguments in terms of a defense relation. The following are two simple examples.
F1 : a // c1 // c2 // b
yyrrr
r F2 : a
// boo
c4
ff▲▲▲▲
c3oo
First, consider a, b in F1 and F2. In F1, accepting a is a reason to accept c2, ac-
cepting c2 is a reason to accept c3, and accepting c3 is a reason to accept a. If we allow
this relation to be transitive, we find that accepting a is a reason to accept a. Similarly,
accepting b is a reason to accept b. Meanwhile, in F2, we have: accepting a is a reason
to accept a, and accepting b is a reason to accept b. So, from the perspective of the
reasons for accepting a and b, F2 is equivalent to F1, or F2 is a summarization of F1.
Second, consider the question when two argument graphs are equivalent in a dy-
namic setting. For F3 and F4 below, both of them have a complete extension {a, c}.
However, the reasons of accepting c in F3 and F4 are different. For the former, c is
2 B. Liao and L. van der Torre
defended by a, while for the latter, c is unattacked and has no defender. In this sense,
F3 and F4 are not equivalent. For example, in order to change the status of argument
c from “accepted” to “rejected”, in F3, one may produce a new argument to attack the
defender a, or to directly attack c. However, in F4 using an argument to attack a cannot
change the status of c, since a is not a defender of c.
F3 : a // b // c F4 : a // b c
From the above two examples, one question arises: under what conditions, can two
argument graphs be viewed as equivalent? The existing notions of argumentation equiv-
alence, including standard equivalence and strong equivalence, are not sufficient to cap-
ture the equivalence of the argument graphs in the situations mentioned above. More
specifically,F1 andF2 are not equivalent in terms of the notion of standard equivalence
or that of strong equivalence, but they are equivalent in the sense that the reasons for
accepting arguments a and b in these two graphs are the same. F3 and F4 are equiva-
lent in terms of standard equivalence, but they are not equivalent in the sense that the
reasons for accepting c in these two graphs are different. Although the notion of strong
equivalence can be used to identify the difference between F3 and F4, conceptually it
is not defined from the perspective of reasons for accepting arguments.
Note that the reasons for accepting arguments in the above two examples are de-
picted in terms of a defense relation, which plays a central role in Dung’s concept of
admissibility and thus in admissibility based semantics. So, it is natural to define a new
semantics in this paper based on a defense relation such that the reasons for accepting
arguments can be encoded.
Since the new semantics is defined at the level of abstract argumentation, it can be
applied to various structured argumentations systems. In particular, in the field of legal
reasoning [20], argumentation can be used to model legal interpretation, dialogue, and
deontic reasoning, etc. In all these applications, it is useful to make clear the reasons for
accepting arguments in terms of a defense relation. In this paper, we will formulate a
defense semantics for abstract argumentation,while its application to various structured
argumentation systems is left to future work. The structure of this paper is as follows. In
Section 2, we introduce some basic notions of argumentation semantics. In Section 3,
we propose the notions of defenses and defense graphs, which lay a foundation of this
paper. In Section 4, we formulate defense semantics by applying classical argumen-
tation semantics to defense graphs, and study some properties of this new semantics.
In Section 5, we introduce two kinds of reasons for accepting arguments in terms of
defense semantics. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Argumentation semantics
An argument graph or argumentation framework (AF) is defined asF = (A,→), where
A is a finite set of arguments and→⊆ A×A is a set of attacks between arguments [4].
Let F = (A,→) be an argument graph. Given a set B ⊆ A and an argument
α ∈ A, B attacks α, denoted B → α, iff there exists β ∈ B such that β → α. Given
an argument α ∈ A, let α← = {β ∈ A | β → α} be the set of arguments attacking α,
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and α→ = {β ∈ A | α → β} be the set of arguments attacked by α. When α← = ∅,
we say that α is unattacked, or α is an initial argument.
Given F = (A,→) and E ⊆ A, we say: E is conflict-free iff ∄α, β ∈ E such that
α→ β; α ∈ A is defended by E iff ∀β ∈ α←, it holds thatE → β; E is admissible iff
E is conflict-free, and each argument in E is defended by E; E is a complete extension
iff E is admissible, and each argument in A that is defended by E is in E; E is a
grounded extension iff E is the minimal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension; E
is a preferred extension iff E is a maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) complete extension;
E is a stable extension iff E is conflict-free and E attacks each argument that is not
in E. We use σ(F) to denote the set of argument extensions of F under semantics σ,
where σ is a function mapping each argument graph to a set of argument extensions.
We use co, gr, pr and st to denote complete, grounded, preferred and stable semantics
respectively. There are some other argumentation semantics (cf. [2] for an overview).
For argument graphs F1 = (A1,→1) and F2 = (A2,→2), we use F1 ∪ F2 to
denote (A1 ∪ A2,→1 ∪ →2). The standard equivalence and strong equivalence of
argument graphs are defined as follows. For simplicity, when we talk about equivalence
of AFs, we mainly consider the cases under complete semantics, while the full-fledged
study of equivalence will be presented in an extended version of the present paper.
Definition 1 (Standard and strong equivalence of AFs). [5] Let F and G be two
argument graphs, and σ be a semantics. F and G are of standard equivalence w.r.t. a
semantics σ, in symbols F ≡σ G, iff σ(F) = σ(G). F and G are of strong equivalence
w.r.t. a semantics σ, in symbols F ≡σ
s
G, iff for every argument graph H, it holds that
σ(F ∪H) = σ(G ∪ H).
Example 1. Consider F1 − F4 in Section 1. In terms of Definition 1, under complete
semantics, since co(F1) 6= co(F2), F1 6≡co F2, which implies that F1 6≡cos F2. And,
since co(F3) = co(F4), F3 ≡co F4. Let H = ({d}, {d → a}). Since co(F3 ∪ H) 6=
co(F4 ∪H), F3 6≡
co
s F4.
Given an argument graph F = (A,→), the kernel of F under complete semantics,
call c-kernel, is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (c-kernel of an AF). [5] For an argument graph F = (A,→), the c-
kernel of F is defined as Fck = (A,→ck), where →ck=→ \{α → β | α 6= β, α →
α, β → β}.
According to [5], it holds that co(F) = co(Fck), and for any AFs F and G, Fck =
Gck iff F ≡co
s
G.
3 Defenses and defense graph
According to classical argumentation semantics, with respect to an extension E, an
argument α ∈ E is accepted because it is initial or for all γ ∈ α←, γ is attacked by
an argument in E. So, for all α, β ∈ E, if there exists γ ∈ A \ E such that α → γ
and γ → β, we say that accepting α is a (partial) reason to accept β, denoted as 〈α, β〉.
And, for all β ∈ E if β← = ∅ (i.e., β is an initial argument), we say that β is accepted
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without a reason, denoted as 〈ø, β〉 where ø is a symbol denoting an empty position. In
this paper, 〈α, β〉 or 〈ø, β〉 is called a defense.
Without referring to any specific extension, a defense 〈α, β〉 can be viewed as a
relation between α and β satisfying some constraints. Intuitively, there are the following
two minimal constraints. First, {α, β} is conflict-free. Otherwise, they can not be both
accepted. Second, there exists γ ∈ A \ {α, β} such that α → γ and γ → β, in the
sense that α defends β by attacking β’s attacker γ. Regarding the defense 〈ø, β〉, the
only constraint is that β is initial.
Example 2. ConsiderF5 below. 〈ø, a〉, 〈a, c〉 and 〈b, d〉 are defenses. Note that the three
defenses do not refer to a specific extension.
F5 : a // b // c // d
Based on the above analysis, we have the following definition.
Definition 3 (Defense). Let F = (A,→) be an argument graph. For α, β ∈ A, 〈α, β〉
is a defense iff {α, β} is conflict-free, and ∃γ ∈ A such that α→ γ and γ → β; 〈ø, β〉
is a defense iff β is initial.
The set of defenses of F is denoted as FDEF . Given a defense 〈α, β〉 or 〈ø, β〉 ∈
FDEF , we call α the defender, and β the defendee, of the defense. Given a setD ⊆ FDEF ,
we write defendee(D) = {β | 〈α, β〉, 〈ø, β〉 ∈ D} to denote the set of defendees inD,
defender(D) = {α | 〈α, β〉 ∈ D} to denote the set of defenders in D, and def(D) =
defendee(D) ∪ defender(D) be the set of defendees and defenders inD. Note that not
all arguments of an AF are included in the defenses. Consider the following example.
Example 3. In F6, F7 and F8, 〈a2, a4〉, 〈a3, a5〉, 〈a4, a6〉, 〈ø, a7〉, 〈a7, a9〉, 〈ø, a11〉
and 〈a11, a13〉 are defenses, while some defense-like pairs, for instance (a1, a3) and
(a14, a13), are not defenses since both {a1, a3} and {a14, a13} are not conflict-free.
And, (ø, a10), (ø, a14) and (ø, a15) are not defenses, because they are not initial argu-
ments, but either self-attacked or attacked by a self-attacked argument.
F6 : a1 // a2 // a3 //
}}
a4 // a5 // a6 F8 : a11 // a12 // a13
F7 : a7 // a8 // a9 a10oo
zz
a14
%% // a15
99tttt
Given a defense 〈x, α〉 where x ∈ A ∪ {ø} and α ∈ A, 〈x, α〉 can be regarded as
a meta-argument. Its status is affected by other defenses and/or other defense-like pairs
(cf. (a1, a3) and (ø, a10) in Example 3). Since the pairs like (a1, a3) and (ø, a10) are
not accepted as a defense, but may be used to hamper the acceptance of some defenses,
their behavior is similar to that of defeaters in defeasible logic. We call them defeaters
of defenses (DoD).
Definition 4 (Defeaters of defenses). Let F = (A,→) be an argument graph. For
α, β ∈ A,
– (α, β) is a DoD, iff {α, β} is not conflict-free, and ∃γ ∈ A \ {α, β} such that
α→ γ and γ → β.
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– (ø, β) is a DoD, iff β is self-attacked or attacked by a self-attacked argument.
The set of DoDs of F is denoted as FDoD .
In this definition, note that (α, β) and (ø, β) are not accepted as a defense, and
may be used to hamper the acceptance of some defenses. This does not mean that the
argumentsα and β in the corresponding argument graph can not be accepted, since they
may in some defenses at the same time. See the following example.
Example 4. InF9, 〈a, c〉, while (ø, b), (ø, c) and (b, d) are DoDs. c is both in the defense
〈a, c〉 and in the DoD (ø, c). When 〈a, c〉 is accepted, c is accepted.
F9 : a // b //

c // d
Note also that in Definition 4 when β is attacked by a self-attacked argument, it is a
DoD. Consider F8 in Example 3. 〈a11, a13〉 is a defense. If (ø, a15) is not a DoD, then
there is no DoD to prevent the acceptance of 〈a11, a13〉.
Let arg(FDoD) = {α, β | (α, β) ∈ FDoD} ∪ {β | (ø, β) ∈ FDoD} be the set
of arguments involved in FDoD. Let def(FDEF)→ be the set of arguments attacked by
def(FDEF). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. LetF = (A,→) be an argument graph. It holds thatA = arg(FDoD)∪
def(FDEF) ∪ def(FDEF)→.
This proposition states that arguments in F are equivalent to the union of the argu-
ments in defenses, arguments in defeaters of defenses, and the arguments attacked by
the arguments in defenses.
LetFd = FDEF∪FDoD be the set of defenses and their defeaters. The attack relation
between the elements of Fd can be identified according to the attack relation between
the arguments involved. For convenience,we also write [x, β] to denote a defense 〈x, β〉
or a defeater of defenses (x, β) where x ∈ A ∪ {ø} and β ∈ A. Formally we have the
following definition.
Definition 5 (Attacks between defenses and their defeaters). For all [x, α], [y, β] ∈
Fd where x, y ∈ A ∪ {ø} and α, β ∈ A, we say that [x, α] attacks [y, β], denoted as
[x, α]→d [y, β] iff x→ y, x→ β , α→ y, or α→ β.
The set of attacks between defenses and their defeaters is denoted as →d. Given
D ⊆ Fd andX ∈ Fd, we use D →d X to denote that ∃Y ∈ D such that Y →d X .
Since the status of a defense is determined by that of other defenses and affected by
defeaters of defenses through the attacks between them, to evaluate the status of normal
defenses, one possible way is to use defense graph, which is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Defense graph). Let F = (A,→) be an argument graph. Let Fd =
FDEF ∪ FDoD . A defense graph w.r.t. F , denoted d(F), is defined as follows.
d(F) = (Fd,→d) (1)
A defense graph can be viewed as a kind of meta-argumentation [11].
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Example 5. The defense graph of F6 is as follows.
d(F6) : (a2, a1) //
&&▼▼
▼▼
▼

(a3, a2) //

oo

〈a2, a4〉 // 〈a3, a5〉oo

(a1, a3)
OOff
WW
〈a4, a6〉
OO
4 Defense semantics
In a defense graph d(F) = (Fd,→d), nodes are defenses and/or defeaters of defenses,
rather than arguments in the corresponding argument graphF . So, when applying clas-
sical semantics to d(F), we get a set of extensions, each of which is a set of defenses.
By slightly modifying the definition for classical semantics, defense semantics can be
defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Defense semantics). Defense semantics is a function Σ mapping each
defense graph to a set of extensions of defenses. Given a defense graph d(F) = (Fd,→d
) where Fd = FDEF ∪ FDoD , let D ⊆ FDEF . We have:
– D is conflict-free iff ∄X,Y ∈ D such thatX →d Y .
– X ∈ FDEF is defended by D iff for all Y ∈ Fd, if Y →d X , then ∃Z ∈ D such
that Z →d Y .
– D is admissible iff D is conflict-free and each member inD is defended byD.
– D is a complete extension of defenses iffD is admissible, and each member inFDEF
that is defended byD is inD.
– D is the grounded extension of defenses iff D is the minimal (w.r.t. set-inclusion)
complete extension of defenses.
– D is a preferred extension of defenses iffD is a maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) com-
plete extension of defenses.
– D is a stable extension of defenses iffD is conflict-free, and ∀X ∈ Fd \D,D →d
X .
The set of complete, grounded, preferred, and stable extensions of defenses of d(F)
is denoted as CO(d(F)), GR(d(F)), PR(d(F)) and ST(d(F)) respectively.
Note that the notion of defense semantics is similar to that of classical semantics.
The only difference is that in a defense graph, we differentiate two kinds of nodes:
defenses and defeaters of defenses. The former can be included in extensions, while the
latter are only used to prevent the acceptance of some defenses.
Now, let us consider some properties of the defense semantics of an argument graph.
The first property is about the relation between defense semantics and classical se-
mantics. LetD ∈ Σ(d(F)) be aΣ-extension of d(F). Now the question is whether the
set of defenders and defendees inD is a σ-extension of F . In order to verify this prop-
erty, technically, we first present the follow lemma. The lemma states that ∀〈α, β〉 ∈ D,
if α is attacked by an argument γ ∈ A, then ∃η ∈ def(D) such that η attacks γ.
Lemma 1 For allD ∈ Σ(d(F)), for all 〈x, y〉 ∈ D, for all γ ∈ A, if γ → x or γ → y,
then def(D)→ γ.
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Example 6. Consider d(F1) below. Under complete semantics, CO(d(F1)) = {D1,
D2,D3}whereD1 = {},D2 = {〈a, c2〉, 〈c2, c3〉, 〈c3, a〉},D3 = {〈b, c4〉, 〈c1, b〉, 〈c4, c1〉}.
Take D2 and 〈a, c2〉 in D2 as an example. def(D2) = {a, c2, c3}. For a being attacked
by c4, and c2 being attacked by c1, it holds that def(D2)→ c4 and def(D2)→ c1.
c1 // c2

〈c1, b〉 //

❀
❀❀
❀❀
❀❀
❀❀
❀❀
〈c2, c3〉oo

✄✄
✄✄
✄✄
✄✄
✄✄
✄
F1 : a
OO
b

d(F1) : 〈a, c2〉
OO
//

〈b, c4〉
OO

oo
c4
OO
c3oo 〈c4, c1〉
OO
//
AA
〈c3, a〉
OO
oo
]]
Based on Lemma 1, under complete semantics, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For all D ∈ CO(d(F)), def(D) ∈ co(F).
Theorem 1 makes clear that for each complete defense extension D of a defense
graph, there exists a complete argument extension E of the corresponding argument
graph such thatE is equal to def(D). On the other hand, the following theorem says that
for each complete argument extension E of an argument graph, there exists a complete
defense extension D of the corresponding defense graph such that D = d(E) where
d(E) = {〈x, y〉 ∈ FDEF | x ∈ E ∪ {ø}, y ∈ E}.
Theorem 2. For all E ∈ co(F), d(E) ∈ CO(d(F)).
The relation between argument extensions and defense extensions under other se-
mantics is presented in the following corollaries.
Corollary 1. ∀Σ ∈ {GR,PR, ST}, it holds that ∀D ∈ Σ(d(F)), def(D) ∈ σ(F).
Proofs for Lemma 1, Theorem 1, 2 and Corollary 1 are presented in the Appendix.
In the following theorems and corollaries, when we say Σ ∈ {CO,GR,PR, ST},
σ is referred to co, gr, pr and st, correspondingly. Meanwhile, when we say σ ∈
{co, gr, pr, st}, Σ is referred to CO, GR, PR and ST, correspondingly.
Corollary 2. ∀Σ ∈ {GR,PR, ST} it holds that ∀E ∈ σ(F), d(E) ∈ Σ(d(F)).
Proof. Under grounded semantics, we need to verify that d(E) is minimal (w.r.t. set-
inclusion). Assume the contrary. Then ∃D′ ( d(E) such that D′ is a grounded exten-
sion. According to theorem1, def(D′) is a complete extension. It follows that def(D′) (
def(d(E)) = E. It turns out that E is not a grounded extension. Contradiction.
Under preferred semantic, it is easy to verify that d(E) is maximal (w.r.t. set-
inclusion).
Under stable semantics, we need to prove that for all [x, α] ∈ Fd \ d(E): d(E) →
[x, α]. Assume the contrary. Then, ∃[x, α] ∈ Fd \ d(E) such that d(E) does not attack
[x, α]. So, E does not attack x and α. Since E is stable, it holds that {x, α} \ {ø} ⊆ E.
So, [x, α] ∈ E. Contradiction.
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Theorems 1 and 2 and Corollaries 1 and 2 describe the relation between argument
extensions and defense extensions under various semantics. This relation can be further
described by two equations in the following two corollaries. First, by overloading the
notation, let d(σ(F)) = {d(E) | E ∈ σ(F)}, where σ ∈ {co, gr, pr, st}.
Corollary 3. For all σ ∈ {co, pr, gr, st}, it holds that d(σ(F)) = Σ(d(F)).
Proof. For all d(E) ∈ d(σ(F)), according to Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, d(E) ∈
Σ(d(F)). For all D ∈ Σ(d(F)), according to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, def(D) ∈
σ(F). Since d(def(D)) = {〈β, α〉 ∈ FDEF | α, β ∈ def(D)} ∪ {〈ø, α〉 ∈ FDEF | α ∈
def(D)} = D, it holds thatD ∈ d(σ(F)).
Example 7. Consider F10 and d(F10) below. Under complete semantics, we have:
– co(F10) = {E1, E2}, where E1 = {}, E2 = {b};
– d(co(F10)) = {d(E1), d(E2)}, where d(E1) = {}, d(E2) = {〈b, b〉};
– CO(d(F10)) = {D1, D2}, whereD1 = {},D2 = {〈b, b〉}.
So, it holds that d(co(F10)) = CO(d(F10)).
F10 : a // boo

d(F10) : 〈a, a〉 //
''❖❖
❖❖❖
❖
〈b, b〉
''❖❖
❖❖❖
❖
oo
ww♦♦♦
♦♦♦ 
c
cc❍❍❍❍❍❍
(a, c)
==
77
,,
//
OO
(c, b)
GG
oo //
gg
(b, a)
zz
rr
oo
gg
aa
Second, by overloading the notation, let def(Σ(d(F))) = {def(D) | D ∈ Σ(d(F))},
where Σ ∈ {CO,GR,PR, ST}.
Corollary 4. For all Σ ∈ {CO,GR,PR, ST}, it holds that σ(F) = def(Σ(d(F))).
Proof. For all E ∈ σ(F), according to Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, d(E) ∈ Σ(d(F)).
Since def(d(E)) = E, E ∈ def(Σ(d(F))). For all def(D) ∈ def(Σ(d(F))), since
D ∈ Σ(d(F)), according to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, def(D) ∈ co(F).
Example 8. Under compete semantics, continue Example 7, def(CO(d(F10))) = {def(D1),
def(D2)}, where def(D1) = {}, def(D2) = {b}. It holds that co(F10) = def(CO(d(F10))).
The second property formulated in Theorems 3, 4 is about the equivalence of argu-
ment graphs under defense semantics, called defense equivalence of argument graphs.
Definition 8 (Defense equivalence of AFs). Let F and G be two argument graphs.
F and G are of defense equivalence w.r.t. a semantics Σ, denoted as F ≡Σd G, iff
Σ(d(F)) = Σ(d(G)).
Concerning the relation between defense equivalence and standard equivalence of
argument graphs, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let F and G be two argument graphs, and Σ ∈ {CO,GR,PR, ST} be a
semantics. If F ≡Σd G, then F ≡
σ G.
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Proof. If F ≡Σd G, then Σ(d(F)) = Σ(d(G)). According to Corollary 4, it follows
that σ(F) = def(Σ(d(F))) = def(Σ(d(G))) = σ(G). Since σ(F) = σ(G), F ≡σ G.
Note that F ≡σ G does not imply F ≡Σd G in general. Consider the following
example under complete semantics.
Example 9. Since co(F3) = co(F4) = {{a, c}}, it holds that F3 ≡co F4. Since
CO(d(F3)) = {{〈ø, a〉}, 〈a, c〉} and CO(d(F4)) = {{〈ø, a〉}, 〈ø, c〉}, CO(d(F3)) 6=
CO(d(F4)). So, it is not the case that F3 ≡COd F4.
F3 : a // b // c d(F3) : 〈ø, a〉 〈a, c〉
F4 : a // b c d(F4) : 〈ø, a〉 〈ø, c〉
About the relation between defense equivalence and strong equivalence of argument
graphs, under complete semantics, we have the following lemma and theorem.
Lemma 2 It holds that CO(d(F)) = CO(d(Fck)).
Proof. According to Corollary 3, d(co(F)) = CO(d(F)), d(co(Fck)) = CO(d(Fck)).
Since co(F) = co(Fck), CO(d(F)) = d(co(F)) = d(co(Fck)) = CO(d(Fck)).
Theorem 4. Let F and G be two argument graphs. If F ≡co
s
G, then F ≡CO
d
G.
Proof. If F ≡cos G, then F
ck = Gck. So, CO(d(Fck)) = CO(d(Gck)). According
to Lemma 2, CO(d(F)) = CO(d(Fck)), CO(d(G)) = CO(d(Gck)). So, we have
CO(d(F)) = CO(d(G)), i.e., F ≡CO
d
G.
Note that F ≡COd G does not imply F ≡
co
s G in general. Consider the following
example.
Example 10. Since CO(d(F3)) = CO(d(F11)) = {{〈ø, a〉}, 〈a, c〉}, F3 ≡COd F11.
However, since Fck3 6= F
ck
11 , F3 6≡
co
s
F11.
F11 : a //
❃
❃❃
b // c d(F11) : 〈ø, a〉 〈a, c〉
d
@@   
5 Encoding reasons for accepting arguments
Defense semantics can be used to encode reasons for accepting arguments. Consider
the following example.
Example 11. CO(d(F12)) = {D1, D2}, whereD1 = {〈b, b〉, 〈b, d〉, 〈g, d〉, 〈e, g〉, 〈ø, e〉},
D2 = {〈a, a〉, 〈g, d〉, 〈e, g〉, 〈ø, e〉}. One way to capture reasons for accepting argu-
ments is to relate each reason to an extension of defenses. For instance, concerning the
reasons for accepting d w.r.t.D1, we differentiate the following reasons:
– Direct reason: accepting {b, g} is a direct reason for accepting d. This reason can
be identified in terms of defenses 〈b, d〉 and 〈g, d〉 inD1.
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– Root reason: accepting {e, b} is a root reason for accepting d, in the sense that
each element of a root reason is either an initial argument, or an argument without
further defenders except itself. This reason can be identified by means of viewing
each defense as a binary relation, and allowing this relation to be transitive. Given
〈e, g〉 and 〈g, d〉 inD1, we have 〈e, d〉. Since e is an initial argument, it is an element
of the root reason. Given 〈b, d〉 in D1, since b’s defender is b itself, b is an element
of the root reason.
F12 : d d(F12) : 〈a, a〉 //

〈b, b〉oo

✞✞
✞✞
✞✞
✞✞
✞✞
a // boo // c
OO
〈b, d〉
OO
//

〈a, c〉
OO
oo

e // f // g
OO
〈f, c〉 //

OO
〈g, d〉
OO
oo
〈e, g〉
OO
CC✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞✞
〈ø, e〉
dd❏❏❏❏❏
The informal notions in Example 11 are formulated as follows.
Definition 9 (Direct reasons for accepting arguments). Let F = (A,→) be an ar-
gument graph. Direct reasons for accepting arguments in F under a semantics Σ is a
function, denoted drF
Σ
, mapping from F to sets of arguments, such that for all α ∈ A,
drFΣ(α) = {DR(α,D) | D ∈ Σ(d(F))} (2)
where DR(α,D) = {β | 〈β, α〉 ∈ D}, if α is not an initial argument; otherwise,
DR(α,D) = {ø}.
Example 12. Continue Example 11. According to Definition 9, drF12
CO
(d) = {R1, R2},
where R1 = {b, g},R2 = {g}. dr
F12
CO
(f) = {R3, R4}, where R3 = R4 = {}.
For all D ∈ Σ(d(F)), we view D as a transitive relation, and let D+ be the transi-
tive closure ofD.
Definition 10 (Root reasons for accepting arguments). Let F = (A,→) be an ar-
gument graph. Root reasons for accepting arguments in F under a semantics Σ is a
function, denoted rrF
Σ
, mapping from F to sets of arguments, such that for all α ∈ A,
rrF
Σ
(α) = {RR(α,D) | D ∈ Σ(d(F))} (3)
where RR(α,D) = {β ∈ A | 〈β, β〉 ∈ D+, β = α} ∪ {β ∈ A | (〈β, α〉 ∈
D+), (〈β, β〉 ∈ D+ ∨ β← = ∅)}, if α is not initial; otherwise,RR(α,D) = {ø}.
According Definition 10, we say that a set of argumentsRR(α,D) is a root reason
of an argument α iff for all β ∈ RR(α,D), β is either equal to α when α (partially)
defends itself directly or indirectly through a transitive relation of defenses in D, or an
initial argument, or an argument that can (partially) defend itself directly or indirectly.
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Example 13. Continue Example 11. D+1 = D1 ∪ {〈e, d〉, 〈ø, g〉, 〈ø, d〉}; D
+
2 = D2 ∪
{〈e, d〉, 〈ø, g〉, 〈ø, d〉}. According to Definition 10, rrF12
CO
(d) = {R1, R2}, where R1 =
{b, e}, R2 = {e}. rr
F12
CO
(f) = {R3, R4}, where R3 = R4 = {}.
Motivated by the first example in Section 1 (regarding F1), based on the notion of
root reasons, we propose as follows a notion of root equivalence of AFs.
Definition 11 (Root equivalence of AFs). Let F = (A1,→1) and H = (A2,→2)
be two argument graphs. For all B ⊆ A1 ∩ A2, if B 6= ∅, we say that F and H are
equivalent w.r.t. the root reasons for acceptingB under semanticsΣ, denotedF|B ≡Σrr
H|B, iff for all α ∈ B, rrF
Σ
(α) = rrH
Σ
(α).
When B = A1 = A2, we write F ≡Σrr H for F|B ≡
Σ
rr
H|B.
Example 14. ConsiderF1 andF2 in Section 1 again. Under complete semantics,CO(d(F1)) =
{D1, D2, D3}whereD1 = {},D2 = {〈a, c2〉, 〈c2, c3〉, 〈c3, a〉},D3 = {〈b, c4〉, 〈c1, b〉, 〈c4, c1〉}.
CO(d(F2)) = {D4, D5, D6}whereD4 = {},D5 = {〈a, a〉},D6 = {〈b, b〉}. LetB =
{a, b}. rrF1
CO
(a) = {{}, {a}, {}}, rrF2co (a) = {{}, {a}, {}}, rr
F1
CO
(b) = {{}, {}, {b}},
rrF2co (b) = {{}, {}, {b}}. So, it holds that F1|B =
CO
rr F2|B.
Theorem 5. Let F = (A1,→1) and H = (A2,→2) be two argument graphs. If
F ≡COrr H, then F ≡
co H.
Proof. According to Definition 10, the number of extensions of co(F) is equal to
the number of rrFCO(α), where α ∈ A1. Since rr
F
CO(α) = rr
H
CO(α), A1 = A2. Let
rrFCO(α) = rr
H
CO(α) = {R1, . . . , Rn}. Let co(F) = {E1, . . . , En} be the set of exten-
sions of F , where n ≥ 1. For all α ∈ A1, for all Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, we have α ∈ Ei iff
Ri 6= {}, in that in terms of Definition 10,when Ri 6= {}, there is a reason to accept
α. On the other hand, let co(H) = {S1, . . . , Sn} be the set of extensions of H. For
all α ∈ A2 = A1, for all Ri, i = 1, . . . , n, for the same reason, we have α ∈ Si iff
Ri 6= {}. So, it holds that Ei = Si for i = 1, . . . , n, and hence co(F) = co(H), i.e.,
F ≡co H.
Note that F ≡co H does not implyF ≡COrr H in general. This can be easily verified
by considering F3 and F4 in Example 9.
The notion of root equivalence of argument graphs can be used to capture a kind of
summarization in the graphs. Consider the following example borrowed from [8].
Example 15. Let F13 = (A,→) and F13 = (A′,→′), illustrated below. Under com-
plete semantics, F13 is a summarization of F13 in the sense that A′ ⊆ A, and the
root reason of each argument in F13 is the same as that of each corresponding argu-
ment in F13. More specifically, it holds that rr
F13
CO
(e3) = rr
F13
CO
(e3) = {{e1, e2}},
rrF13
CO
(e2) = rr
F13
CO
(e2) = {{ø}}, and rr
F13
CO
(e1) = rr
F13
CO
(e1) = {{ø}}.
F13 : e1 // a1 // a2 // o // e3 F13 : e1 // o // e3
e2 // b1 // b2
<<③③③
e2
==③③③
Definition 12 (Summarization of AFs). Let F = (A1,→1) and H = (A2,→2) be
two argument graphs. F is a summarization of H under a semantics σ iff A1 ⊂ A2,
and F|A1 ≡σrr H|A1.
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Now, a property of summarization of argument graphs under complete semantics is
as follows.
Theorem 6. Let F = (A1,→1) and H = (A2,→2) be two argument graphs. If F is
a summarization of H under complete semantics CO, then CO(F) = {E ∩ A2 | E ∈
CO(H)}.
Proof. Let co(F) = {E1, . . . , En}, co(H) = {S1, . . . , Sn}. According to the proof of
Theorem 5, E1 = S1 ∩ A2. Therefore, we have co(F) = {E ∩ A2 | E ∈ co(H)}.
The property looks similar to that of directionality of argumentation [12]. However,
they are conceptually different. Specifically, it is said that if a semantics σ satisfies
the property of directionality iff ∀F = (A,→), ∀U ⊆ A, if U is an unattacked set,
then σ(F ↓ U) = {E ∩ U | E ∈ σ(F)} where F ↓ U = (U,→ ∩(U × U)). So,
the property of directionality is about the relation between an argument graph and its
subgraph induced by an unattacked set . By contrast, the property of summarization of
argument graphs is about the relation between two root equivalent argument graphs.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a defense semantics of argumentation based on a novel
notion of defense graphs, and used it to encode reasons for accepting arguments. By in-
troducing two new kinds of equivalence relation between argument graphs, i.e., defense
equivalence and root equivalence, we have shown that defense semantics can be used
to capture the equivalence of argument graphs from the perspective of reasons for ac-
cepting arguments. In addition, we have defined a notion of summarization of argument
graphs by exploiting root equivalence.
Under complete semantics, defense equivalence is located inbetween strong and
standard equivalence. It is interesting to further investigate its position in the so-called
equivalence zoo where further equivalence notions inbetween the two extremal versions
are compared too [13], and to study how defense equivalence, root equivalence and
strong equivalence are related. We will present this part of work in an extended version
of the present paper.
Since defense semantics explicitly represents a defense relation in extensions and
can be used to encoded reasons for accepting arguments, it provides a new way to
investigate topics such as summarization in argumentation [8], dynamics of argumen-
tation [9,14,10], dialogical argumentation [15,16], etc. Further work on these topics
is promising. Meanwhile, it might be interesting to study defense semantics beyond
Dung’s argumentation, including ADFs [17], bipolar frameworks [18], structured argu-
mentation [19], etc. In particular, it would be interesting to apply defense semantics to
modeling the explanation of why a conclusion can be reached. In [21], in order to in-
crease the trust of the users for the Semantic Web applications, a system was proposed
to automatically generate an explanation for every answer about why the answer has
been produced. The notion of proof trace in [21] for explanation is closer to the notion
of support relation between arguments. So, combining the defense relation (which is
based on attack relation) and support relation would be useful to model the explanation
of conclusions of a structured argumentation system.
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Appendix
1. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For all Σ ∈ {CO,GR,PR, ST}, it holds that D ∈ Σ(d(F)) is a complete
extension. With respect to γ there are the following four possible cases. Let us analyze
them one by one. First, γ is initial. In this case, 〈x, y〉 is attacked by 〈ø, γ〉 that is
unattacked. So, D cannot defend 〈x, y〉, contradicting D being a complete extension.
Second, γ is self-attacked. In this case, (ø, γ) ∈ FDoD , and (ø, γ) →d 〈x, y〉. Since
〈x, y〉 is defended by D, ∃〈η, η′〉 ∈ D such that η → γ or η′ → γ. In other word, it
holds that def(D) → γ. Third, γ is attacked by η ∈ A \ {γ}, there are the following
situations:
– η is initial or all attackers of η are attacked by def(D): In this case, η does not
attack x or y. Otherwise, 〈x, y〉 /∈ D. Contradiction.Meanwhile, since {〈η, x〉}∪D
(reps., {〈η, y〉} ∪ D) is conflict-free, and D defends 〈η, x〉 (reps., {〈η, y〉}). Since
D is complete, 〈η, x〉 ∈ D (reps., 〈η, y〉 ∈ D). So, it holds that def(D)→ γ.
– η is self-attacked. In this case, (ø, γ) ∈ FDoD. According to the second point above,
it holds that def(D)→ γ.
– η is attacked by η′ ∈ A \ {η} such that η′ is not attacked by def(D): In this case,
(η′, γ) ∈ Fd, and (η′, γ) →d 〈x, y〉. Since 〈x, y〉 is defended by D, ∃〈θ, θ′〉 ∈ D
such that 〈θ, θ′〉 →d (η′, γ). Since η′ is not attacked by θ or θ′, γ is attacked by θ
or θ′. In other words, it holds that def(D)→ γ.
2. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let E = def(D). Under complete semantics, we need to prove: 1)E is conflict-
free, 2) E defends each member of E, and 3) each argument in A that is defended by
E is in E. Details:
– For all α, β ∈ E, α and β are defenders or defendees of defenses in D. SinceD is
conflict-free, according to Definition 5, it is obvious that E is conflict-free.
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– For all α ∈ E, ∃〈x, α〉 ∈ D or 〈α, x〉 ∈ D where x ∈ A ∪ {ø}. For all γ ∈ A, if γ
attacks α, according to Lemma 2, E → γ. So, α is defended by E.
– For all α ∈ A, if α is defended by E, we have the following possible cases:
• α is unattacked: In this case, 〈ø, α〉 is inD. That is, α ∈ E.
• α is attacked by some arguments in F : For all γ ∈ α←, since α is defended
by E, there exists δ ∈ E such that δ → γ. It follows that 〈δ, α〉 ∈ FDEF , and
∃〈x, δ〉 ∈ D or 〈δ, x〉 ∈ D where x ∈ E ∪ {ø}. . Then, we have the following:
∗ if 〈δ, α〉 is unattacked, then since D is complete, 〈δ, α〉 ∈ D, i.e., α ∈ E;
otherwise,
∗ for all [u, η] ∈ Fd: [u, η] →d 〈δ, α〉, if u or η attacks α, then since α is
defended by E, there exists 〈ψ, ψ′〉 ∈ D such that ψ or ψ′ attacks u or η.
In other words, 〈ψ, ψ′〉 attacks [u, η]; if u or η attacks δ, then [u, η] attacks
〈x, δ〉 or 〈δ, x〉. Since D is complete, there exists 〈θ, θ′〉 ∈ D such that
〈θ, θ′〉 attacks [u, η]. So, 〈δ, α〉 is defended by D. Since D is complete, it
holds that 〈δ, α〉 ∈ D, and therefore α ∈ E.
3. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. For all E ∈ co(F), since it is obvious that d(E) is conflict-free, we need to
verify: 1) d(E) defends each member of d(E), and 2) each defense in FDEF that is
defended by d(E) is in d(E). Details:
– For all 〈β, α〉 ∈ d(E), for all [x, y] ∈ Fd, if [x, y] attacks 〈β, α〉 such that x → β
or y → β, or x→ α or y → α, since E is a complete extension, ∃η ∈ E such that
η → x or η → y. So, 〈η, β〉 or 〈η, α〉 is in d(E), and 〈η, β〉 or 〈η, α〉 attacks [x, y].
In other words, d(E) defends each member of d(E).
– For all 〈α, β〉 ∈ FDEF , if 〈α, β〉 is defended by d(E), then both α and β are
defended by def(d(E)) = E. Since E is a complete extension, α, β ∈ E. So,
〈α, β〉 ∈ d(E).
4. Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. ForE = def(D), under grounded semantics, we need to prove thatE is minimal
(w.r.t. set-inclusion). Assume the contrary. Then ∃E′ ( E such that E′ is a grounded
extension. According to Theorem 2, it holds that d(E) ∈ CO(d(F)) and d(E′) ∈
CO(d(F)). SinceE′ ( E, it holds that d(E′) ( d(E). Since d(E) = d(def(D)) = D,
d(E′) ( D. It turns out that D is not a minimal complete extension, contradicting
D ∈ GR(d(F)).
Under preferred semantic, similarly, it is easy to verify that E is maximal (w.r.t.
set-inclusion). So, for all D ∈ PR(d(F)), def(D) ∈ pr(F).
Under stable semantics, we need to prove that for all α ∈ A \ E: E → α. Assume
the contrary. Then, ∃α ∈ A \ E such that E does not attack α. There are the following
possible cases:
– α self-attacks. In this case, (ø, α) ∈ Fd \ D. Since D is a stable extension, D
attacks (ø, α). So, E attacks α. Contradiction.
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– α does not self-attack. Since α can not be initial, α is attacked by some argument
β ∈ A. It follows that β /∈ E and β does not self-attack. So, β is attacked by some
argument γ ∈ A. So, [γ, α] ∈ Fd. Since α /∈ E, [γ, α] /∈ D. Since D is a stable
extension,D attacks [γ, α]. SinceE = def(D) does not attack α, ∃η ∈ E such that
η attacks γ, and η does not attack α. Since α, β and η do not self-attack, we have
the following possible cases:
• {η, β} is conflict-free: In this case, 〈η, β〉 ∈ FDEF . Since E cannot attack η, if
〈η, β〉 /∈ D, ∃ψ ∈ E such that ψ attacks β. So, [ψ, α] ∈ Fd. Since [ψ, α] /∈ D,
[ψ, α] is attacked byD. Since E does not attack ψ, E attacks α. Contradiction.
• {η, β} is not conflict-free: If η attacks β, [η, α] ∈ Fd. It follows that E attacks
α. Contradiction. If η does not attack β, but β attacks η, 〈η, β〉 ∈ FDEF . This
case also leads to a contradiction.
